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C ontemplating geography as it relates to strategy is not an activity that most of us elect to do on a Saturday afternoon.
A friend's comment comes to mind: the only thing he remembered about geography from his school experience was
that he didn't like it. Indeed, too many of us have the notion that geography, and particularly strategic geography, has
become a relic science of little use to the modern military professional. Since we have access to the latest
developments in technology and information, who needs to know the location of the Straits of Malacca, or understand
cultural settlement patterns in Africa, or know what is contained on continental shelves?[1]
Students and practitioners of national security policy learn through their experience, or know through intuition, that
strategy is carried out over territory and space. In the final analysis, military operations consist of controlling territory
and influencing populations. The subjection of territory and populations, as well as control of the space above the
territory, are geographical considerations. All this may be a bit Clausewitzian; nevertheless, few attempt to refute
Clausewitz's argument that territory, people, and those who control those physical factors are the foundations upon
which a successful strategy is built. Similarly, Sun Tzu argued 2000 years before Clausewitz that "the elements of the
art of war are first, measurement of space; second, estimation of quantities; third, calculations; fourth, comparisons;
and fifth, chances of victory." Geography for the military professional should include the study of subjects that will
lend clarity to the issues of spatiality that enable calculations and comparisons. To ensure that a specific concept or
plan produces the desired strategic ends, strategists should first make a determined effort to become as familiar with
the fields of geography as they are with history or any other academic discipline.[2]
This article seeks to demonstrate the immutable importance of geography for strategists. Misunderstanding or misusing
geography can confuse our thinking and thwart our best efforts at developing effective national security strategy.
Knowledgeably and sensibly applied, however, geography is a discipline that can clarify strategic issues and increase
the chances of success in any political, economic, or military endeavor.
Understanding and Misunderstanding Geography
Geographers have broadened what was traditionally considered their discipline, embracing climate, weather,
vegetation, soils, geology, as well as the narrow specialization of place names. The discipline now boasts of regional
specialists and of subfields which include economics, politics, diseases, cultures, urban studies, development,
population, medicine, and even history. Indeed, the Army's regional specialty program requires incumbents to study
and become familiar with many of these same disciplines, and regional specialists are an invaluable resource to the
strategist. But strategists and military professionals should not relegate the study of geographic issues to the few
regionalists still in uniform, Department of State specialists, or civilian academics; rather, all senior military
professionals, especially those who consider strategic concerns, should have a working knowledge of the subfields of
geography. Geography, in all its guises, will help them understand the changes the world is experiencing and make
sense of the directions the world is taking.
Notwithstanding that geography is useful to the strategist, one should not conclude that geography determines where
conflicts will occur or that it should dictate strategy. In the past century several well-known geographic determinists,
including Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and Nicholas Spykman, developed theories from which national policies
evolved. It is widely believed that Mahan was responsible for the United States' reliance on a strong navy to push the
country into expanding its overseas possessions. One result was that in 1898 President McKinley ordered a US fleet of

six warships to Manila Bay. Not knowing the importance of his directive, McKinley professed to reporters he had no
idea where the Philippines were. "God told me to take the Philippines," he is quoted as saying. Only the ineptitude of
the Spanish and our phenomenal luck kept the Spanish-American War from being a debacle.[3]
Nicholas Spykman argued in 1944 that Eurasia's periphery held the key to global power. His theories are considered by
most scholars to have led to political policies that shaped strategic thinking during the Cold War with effects felt to the
present decade. More recently, modern-day strategist Colin Gray dusted off the theory of Sir Halford Mackinder
(1861-1947) that western Russia and Eastern Europe's protected core area, something Mackinder called the
"heartland," would become the stage for world domination. Gray argued Mackinder's thesis in The Geopolitics of Super
Power (1988), observing that "for as far into the future as can be claimed contemporarily relevant, the Soviet Union is
going to remain the source of danger--narrowly to American national security, more broadly (and quite literally) to the
exercise of the values of Western Civilization."[4] Gray's book offers more than a tip-of-the-hat to Mackinder, arguing
that Mackinder's ideas "provide an intellectual architecture, far superior to rival conceptions, for understanding the
principal international security issues"[5]--all this only two years before the Soviet Union collapsed.
One must, of course, exercise caution in using history to explain the geographic significance of a location. In a recent
issue of MHQ, a respected journal of military history, the editor and a contributor postulated that Jerusalem has
historically been a "strategic choke point." Nothing could be further from the truth. The Suez Canal is a "strategic
choke point," but not the city of Jerusalem, even in ancient history. After the Hebrew King David took Jerusalem from
the Jebusites (c. 1010 B.C.), the town was of little international or regional importance. From the opening days of prehistory, Near Eastern armies had moved through the area of Palestine along coastal routes and the Megiddo Pass; they
generally did not even come near to Jerusalem, or Jebus, high in the mountains above the coastal roads. Joshua, the
first known leader to have tried to conquer all the region of Palestine, bypassed Jerusalem.[6] In later history the
Assyrians avoided it, and the Babylonians finally destroyed the city (587-6 B.C.) because they needed the loot and
wanted to repress the troublesome people, more than to control it as a choke point.
Until the city's recent explosive growth, Jerusalem was well off the north-south watershed route and miles south of the
east-west trade routes that crossed Palestine. The city is topographically well situated as a defensive location and was
surrounded for many centuries in ancient times with deep valleys on three sides and had a self-contained water source.
But aside from the hill itself, the city and its inhabitants never controlled (and certainly didn't choke) anything. The
Romans and even Napoleon avoided Jerusalem; each comfortably commanded the area of Palestine for different
lengths of time without destroying the city because of its geographic position. Jerusalem became a strategic location in
history not because of its topography but because of its wealth (from c. 1000 - 586 B.C.), its cultural importance, and
its prominence as the locus of holy sites for three of the world's major religions. Today these same cultural issues
determine the city's strategic importance as well as the fact that the city is the political and religious center of the de
jure Jewish state and the de facto religious and political center of the aspiring state of Palestine.
Contemporary Geographic Issues
Strategists need to familiarize themselves with the diverse sub-fields of geography as well as the traditional concerns
of physical geography. Doing so will help them to understand intertwining nation and state relationships. For example,
a knowledge of environmental geography can help one understand the potential for conflict based on environmental
issues. A persuasive argument has been made that environmental change could shift the balance of power between
states, regionally or globally, causing instabilities that might lead to armed conflict.[7] Warmer temperatures could
cause disputes over new ice-free lanes in the Arctic, or make Antarctica's potential bonanza of natural resources more
accessible, resulting in a worldwide scramble for its treasures. And if recent interpretations of the effects of "global
warming" are even close to accurate, the implications for the national security of the United States are staggering. One
author has put it this way:
The United States has a particularly large investment in the status quo. Its current preeminence in world
affairs ultimately derives from the strength of the country's economy. The productivity of the country's
natural resources, such as the incomparably valuable farmland of the Midwest, was a . . . prerequisite to
America's elevation as a dominant superpower in the latter half of the 20th century. Impending climate
change means this productivity can no longer be taken for granted. The greenhouse effect threatens the

overall health of the American economy and will require a massive diversion of resources to nonproduction adaptive activities.[8]
Among the other aspects of geography that concern contemporary strategists is the issue of international water
passages. There are more than 100 international straits used for navigation that are between six and 24 miles wide.
These passages can correctly be called strategic choke points. The Law of the Sea Convention spells out an elaborate
regime to prevent states that border these important straits from closing them to innocent passage. The United States
has failed to agree to this convention, however, something that has more to do with the future exploitability of
undersea manganese nodules, a potentially important economic consideration, than with national security.
Still, strategists considering plans for moving forces around the globe need to be familiar with the fact that we might
not have free access to get to where we need to fight, including overflight permission. One needs only to remember
that in 1986 the United States was unable to overfly the land territory of France and Spain, our NATO allies, to bomb
Libya. Instead of our aircraft taking the most direct route from their bases in Britain to their targets, the pilots had to
circle west of Spain, thread the needle over the Straits of Gibraltar, strike the target, and return the same way, adding
needless hours to the mission and increasing the risk to the crews.
All too often we take for granted the right of free access in planning for and sustaining interventions. Consider just the
tonnage of munitions that was moved by sea to Saudi Arabia in 1990-91. Then calculate the number of air sorties that
would have been required to move only the highest priority munitions had we been denied access to the Straits of
Gibraltar and Hormuz. Issues involving the Law of the Sea come up frequently and have led to square-offs between
NATO allies as well as legal disputes between the United States and friendly nations. Should we expect the future to
be significantly different?
Interrupting historical water sources is another issue that could lead to conflict. One author has noted that "so critical
are assured water supplies to Israel that one reason it went to war in 1967 was that Syria and Jordan were trying to
divert flows of the Jordan River. Israel receives about 60 percent of its water from the Jordan River, [but] only three
percent of the river's basin lies within the country's pre-1967 territory."[9] It is interesting to note that Article 6 of the
1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty was a delineation of water sources, whereas Article 9 dealt with "Places of Historical and
Religious Significance."[10] Jordan is one of the driest countries on earth and has less water than its neighbors or any
of the states of the Sahara.[11] A strategist might be led to believe that historical sites and land are the only issues at
stake in the Israeli-Palestinian dialogues. The media has rarely mentioned that water is of significant concern to all in
the region.
Another serious contemporary geographical issue is that of world food production. Our recent inconclusive
involvement in Somalia was a direct result of public pressure to alleviate suffering by the inhabitants of that state.
There, as in many other situations, the world has seen that a drop in food production will result in waves of refugees
which can possibly lead to conflicts. However, how many strategists will consider such issues when they wrestle with
America's security policies in the next century?
Despite the propensity of the United States to use or threaten the application of military force since becoming the
world's sole surviving superpower, international conflicts will inevitably involve allies or friends on the other side of
the problem. For example, understanding where the major river systems in the Middle East flow, and through which
countries they travel, can help strategists foresee problems that could arise from dams being constructed in Turkey and
elsewhere. Issues such as these require a knowledge of geography if they are to be anticipated, understood, and settled
to our advantage.
Strategic thinking will often require more options than the direct application of force in solving problems. The ability
to put troops on the ground, a fleet over the horizon, or cruise missiles on station in the belly of an aging B-52 does
not connote sophistication in managing geopolitical issues. Deep and abiding interest in all forms of geography,
however, can help the strategist address problems in ways that involve all the elements of national power in a search
for peaceful outcomes.
Understanding Cultures

Strategists should also become more familiar with the cultural differences among the people of the world, a major and
growing field of geography. A step toward enlightening the military profession was provided by Paul M. Belbutowski's
article, "Strategic Implications of Cultures in Conflict" in the Spring 1996 issue of Parameters.[12] In that same issue,
Major Ralph Peters pointed out in dramatic fashion that the geography of future conflicts may well be the milieu for
which we are the least prepared: the cities and urban complexes of the developing world. As the United States
discovered in Somalia, even a poor and desolate city like Mogadishu, with an estimated population of only 600,000,
can confound our strategic and operational planning. Similarly, the Soviets paid the price of trying to operate in Kabul,
a city with twice that population, using doctrine developed to stop NATO forces in Europe.
In Jeffrey Record's recent article critiquing theories of whether the United States could have won in Vietnam, he
concludes that "the US war effort was compromised not only by failure to appreciate the complexity and evolution of
the war's character, but also by a fundamental ignorance of the country, its history, and culture."[13] Samuel P.
Huntington's seminal article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" also pointed to the importance of understanding cultures.
Huntington stirred academic strategists out of their lethargy in 1993 when he argued that "in the future, the world will
be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations," which he identified as
"Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African."[14] He made
his point that over the centuries, "differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most
violent conflicts."[15] Long-running conflicts between Islamic and other groups in the Philippines and Indonesia
underscore the accuracy of Huntington's insights, while events in the Balkans since 1991 have not seriously challenged
his thesis.
Despite the commitment of US lives and treasure to the effort to solve the Balkan problems and despite the decision by
the President in 1995 to deploy thousands of American fighting men and women to that region, how many US
politicians or interested citizens have developed even an inkling of the morass of cultural, religious, and ethnic
differences existing there? Might a greater general awareness have changed US policy? Might it at least have forced
clearer expectations of the limits of our interest and the duration of our involvement there? Attempts to explain our
presence as "in the American interest" still fall on unbelieving ears. Perhaps that would change if military strategists
and national security policymakers could better comprehend and articulate the importance of cultures, ours as well as
others', in our policy considerations.
Geography and Policy
Martin van Creveld makes the point in his book, The Transformation of War: "The logic of strategy itself requires that
the opponent's motives be understood, since on this rests any prospect of success in war. If, in the process, the notion
of interest has to be thrown overboard, then so be it."[16] Although one could take issue with the implication that the
United States can long maintain troops in the field without a credible national interest at stake, Van Creveld is certainly
right that an opponent's motives must always be understood. However vital, this is a difficult task and one that
American strategists and historians do not do well.
The British Falkland Islands War provides a case in point. In 1982, 14,000 Argentine soldiers seized the undefended
Falklands, 250 miles off the Argentine coast, from the British, who in 1833 had taken control of the windswept, barren
islands best known for harboring penguins, seals, and other marine life. Textbooks have struggled to explain why the
British went to war--undertaking a conflict ultimately costing hundreds of British and Argentine lives, the sinking of
British and Argentinean warships, and enormous sums of money. One text explains the British involvement in this
remarkable fashion: "Ponder, for example, the Falkland Islands War and the venerable British lion's defense of its
territory. Male lions mark off their territory by scenting it. Woe betide any other male lion who enters that claimed
space!"[17] Such observations, offered in a textbook to explain a major strategic move on the part of a NATO ally,
defy reason and logic. They are an affront to common sense and to the intelligence of our students.
Unfortunately, few monographs or articles address the strategic issues at stake in the Falkland Islands War, which
permits such facile fabrications as the preceding to fill the void in attempting to explain strategic issues. Some
legitimate writers have rationalized that the war amounted to little more than a waning Great Britain asserting her
sovereign rights. But this argument hardly seems logical since barely three decades previously the British had
voluntarily given up much greater territorial holdings around the world. Why would Britain risk a war, and her

strategic reputation, by going halfway around the world to contest a few pieces of rock in the South Atlantic? Honor?
Hardly! Geography, on the other hand, can provide some reasons, if not an answer.
The Falklands rise up from one of the world's most extensive underwater continental shelves, a landform rich with
potential oil deposits, whose surrounding seas teem with life and nutrients. Britain's desire to protect a potential
international economic treasure, rather than glib explanations or half-baked theories of biological relativism, offers the
more reasonable explanation for the loss of British (not to mention Argentine) lives. The ageographical quality of our
world causes many of us to overlook the geographical motives for behavior, including the fact that the Falklands are in
close proximity to resource-rich Antarctica, another probable reason for the short but nasty 1982 war. The likelihood of
oil deposits in the South China Sea, the uses of outer space, and the rise of the region-state are other aspects of the
influence of geography on strategy that seldom receive their due.[18]
Outcomes
Consideration of the many subfields of geography may help US national leaders and military strategists both to
develop sound policy and to focus and explain our national strategies in terms acceptable to the American public.
Recently, we have seen America's reluctance to intervene militarily in states whose behavior does not seem to threaten
our national security. This attitude can be traced to the concept that our military forces exist to protect and uphold our
national purposes. Our national security leaders have had to scramble to justify costly foreign interventions because
they have been unable to articulate how such adventures serve our national values and purposes. As a result, they have
sometimes appealed either to the country's lack of understanding of world geography or tried to stimulate a messianic
excuse for the resulting operation.
If Americans had realized where Somalia was located, or how large it is (placed on a map of the United States, it
covers an area from southern Michigan east to Maine and south to northern Florida), would they have been so passive
about sending our forces to that country? Today, two years after thousands of personnel were deployed to the former
Yugoslavia, how many US citizens can identify the nationalities involved or articulate how our national purpose is
served other than to "prevent further fighting between the various factions"? Until the public decides to learn for itself
what it needs to know about security issues, our long-standing ignorance of all aspects of geography will keep us
equally ignorant of the real issues in such decisions. Strategists need to assume the responsibility to educate
themselves so that they can provide effective counsel in the development of national security policy. No one is going
to show them why it is that our ability to intervene militarily (as we discovered in Somalia) is constrained by
geography.
In a recent article, Peter Wooley served the profession well by beginning an examination of geographic variables
(access and isolation) to help analysts and policymakers explain if, and how, the nation might intervene militarily in
international crises.[19] Wooley makes a strong case that "students of foreign policy and national security would do
well to refocus on geography as an essential element of analysis, prediction, and policy recommendation."[20]
Similarly, Colin Gray points out in a recent article that
The argument is neither that geographical setting determines policy and strategy in some all-but-mystical
way, nor that the implications of that setting remain constant as technology evolves, but rather that
geographical factors are pervasive in world politics. Geography defines the players (which are territorially
organized states, or would like to be), frequently defines the stakes for which the players contend, and
always defines the terms in which they measure security relative to others.[21]
These two sources alone would be a good place to begin one's education.
It is important for strategists to refamiliarize themselves with the physical makeup of our globe--with distances,
populations, cities, transportation hubs, routes of communication, and cultures. The wise questions used to develop
strategy--the reasons why and where the United States will go to war in the coming years--will need to be probed by
military strategists. They, along with our political leaders and the public, need to resist the temptation to believe that
the American military can do anything, anywhere. It can't. Geography should be among the prominent disciplines that
strategists use to determine just what we can do, and where.
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